We study the optimal size and composition of an advisory committee when information is dispersed and informed parties di¤er in preferences and beliefs. If agents have similar objectives but disagree due to di¤erent beliefs, communication by committee members exhibits positive externalities, and the manager's expertise enhances the committee's advisory role. Conversely, if agents have con ‡icting preferences, communication externalities are negative, and managerial expertise impedes the advising e¤ectiveness. The optimal advisory body includes all informed agents under heterogeneous beliefs, but a strict subset of informed agents under heterogeneous preferences.
Introduction
Information relevant to corporate decisions is dispersed among many partially informed parties, such as the …rm's managers, employees, shareholders, customers, and industry participants. No manager, even the most experienced and talented one, is fully informed about the optimal course of action, so managers regularly seek advice from other informed agents.
In modern …rms, there exists a large heterogeneity in advisory structures. On many decisions, advice is provided by a relatively small group of people, such as the board of directors. In fact, advising the management is considered one of the most important functions of the board (e.g., Business Roundtable, 1990 ). In many "new age" …rms, like Facebook, Snap, and Spotify, the advisory role is de facto the only role of the board, as their management has virtually full decision-making authority by holding superior-voting shares. For small companies, including startups, that do not have a formal board of directors, having an advisory board is considered a critical element of the company's success. 1 On other decisions, advice to decision-makers is provided by a large group of people. For example, shareholders provide advice through a non-binding vote on corporate governance proposals, such as the …rm's anti-takeover defenses, corporate social responsibility policies, and executive compensation ("say on pay"in the U.S.). Although these votes are purely advisory, …rms often learn from and respond to their results (Ferri, 2012) . Other examples include employee and customer surveys, which are both regularly conducted by companies. 2 Why is there such a heterogeneity in the means of providing advice? If advisory voting is indeed informative, why are not shareholders consulted on a greater variety of corporate decisions? When is it optimal to seek advice from a large group of people (e.g., shareholders through a non-binding vote) vs. a small group of people (e.g., the board)? And is an advisory committee more or less e¢ cient at providing advice if the decision-maker is more informed?
The goal of this paper is to tackle these questions by studying the optimal size and composition of the advisory body. We propose a simple and tractable model that captures the two key features of the advisory process. First, relevant information is dispersed among multiple agents, which creates value from advising. Second, the agents'information may not be perfectly communicated to the manager because of communication frictions. A committee is e¢ cient in its advisory role if its members communicate their information to the manager despite these communication frictions.
Speci…cally, the …rm needs to make a decision, whose value is determined by the unknown state of the world. Multiple agents get private signals about the state, with some agents' signals being potentially more informative than others. The …rm designs an advisory committee, which can be any subset of the agents. The committee members communicate with the partially informed manager by sending non-veri…able messages ("cheap talk"), and the manager then decides on which action to take. There is an in…nitesimal cost of including a committee member, so the …rm does not include agents who are not expected to communicate any information.
Generally, frictions in communication arise if, given the same information, the adviser wants to take a di¤erent action than the manager. Indeed, the adviser may then have incentives to misreport his information to tilt the manager towards his preferred action. There are two reasons why optimal actions may di¤er given the same information -con ‡icting preferences and di¤erences in beliefs. For example, suppose a …rm is deciding on the scale of production in a new market. Consider an agent maximizing shareholder value and the manager. Given the same information, the manager may prefer a larger scale of production for two reasons: he may get private bene…ts from running bigger operations (di¤erent preferences) or he may have "more bullish"priors about the value of increasing the scale (di¤erent beliefs). Our model features heterogeneity in both preferences and beliefs. Consistent with the above intuition, di¤erences in preferences and di¤erences in beliefs have a similar e¤ect:
the stronger these di¤erences are, the stronger are the advisor's incentives to misreport his information to the manager, so the lower is the quality of advice. Nevertheless, we show that these communication frictions have drastically di¤erent implications for optimal advisory structures.
We start by …xing an advisory body and analyzing the incentives of its members to truthfully communicate their information to the manager. We show that these incentives are strongly a¤ected by whether other members of the advisory body reveal their informa- The intuition for the positive externalities e¤ect is that di¤erences in beliefs become less relevant when more agents reveal their information to the manager. Simply speaking, heterogeneous prior beliefs generate disagreement only over the information that is unknown, so there is less to disagree about when more information about the optimal decision is learned.
Thus, if the impedient to communication is heterogeneous beliefs, the manager's and advisers' optimal actions become more congruent as more agents reveal their information to the manager, which improves communication further. The reason for the negative externalities e¤ect is that the manager's action responds less to each agent's message when more agents reveal their information to the manager. Intuitively, when lying to the manager, the agent faces a trade-o¤: he wants to move the manager's decision closer to his own ideal decision, but is afraid to make too big of an impact and move the manager's decision too much, away even from his own ideal decision. This fear encourages truthful communication when the manager strongly reacts to the agent's message, but is not su¢ cient to constrain lying when the manager's reaction to the agent's message is small. The latter is the case when the manager receives information from many other agents.
These di¤erent externalities imply that the size of the advisory body is crucial for the e¤ectiveness of its advisory role, but that the e¤ect of size depends on the nature of communication frictions. We show that if communication is hampered by heterogeneous beliefs, the advisory body is e¤ective (de…ned as truthful communication of its members'private information) only if its size is su¢ ciently large. In contrast, if communication is hampered by heterogeneous preferences, the advisory body is e¤ective only if its size is su¢ ciently small.
This logic leads to the following result: The optimal advisory body is the set of all informed agents under heterogeneous beliefs, but a strict subset of all informed agents under heterogeneous preferences. Practically, including all informed agents in the advisory body can be interpreted as holding an advisory shareholder vote, combined with asking the opinion of other informed stakeholders such as employees and business partners. Our analysis suggests that such an advisory vote will be e¢ cient in its advisory role if shareholders and the manager have common interests but di¤erent beliefs, but will be ine¢ cient if shareholders'preferences are su¢ ciently di¤erent from the manager. Importantly, this does not imply that the advisory vote alone is optimal: rather, it implies that the vote is a necessary part of the optimal advisory process, together with seeking advice from other informed parties. On the other hand, including a strict subset of all informed agents in the advisory body can be interpreted as appointing an advisory board. Our model implies that in contrast to advisory voting, such an advisory board will be e¢ cient in its advisory role if board members and the manager have the same beliefs but di¤erent preferences, but will be ine¢ cient if they disagree due to di¤erent beliefs. This suggests, for example, that it is bene…cial to seek advice via an advisory shareholder vote on issues such as corporate social responsibility proposals, where there is arguably a lot of heterogeneity in beliefs of di¤erent agents. In contrast, on issues such as increasing the scale of production, where con ‡icts of interest are likely to be more important, a relatively small advisory board will be more e¢ cient at providing advice. 3 What is the optimal composition of the advisory board in such situations, when con ‡icts of interest are relatively more important? It is natural to conjecture that, all else equal, the optimal advisory board should include agents with more important information and with preferences that are more aligned to the manager. We show that while the second part of this conjecture is true (because more aligned preferences make advice more credible), the …rst part is not always true: The negative externalities in communication can make it optimal to choose the less informed director out of two potential candidates, even if they have the same preferences.
In practice, boards of directors provide advice on many decisions, even on those where a di¤erent advisory structure may be optimal. We thus explore more generally when a given board will be e¤ective at providing advice, and in particular, ask how the board's advisory role for the manager depends on the manager's expertise. Are the two complements or substitutes? We show that a more informed manager enhances the board's advising e¤ectiveness if heterogeneity in beliefs is relatively more important than heterogeneity in preferences, but impedes its advisory role otherwise. Intuitively, when agents disagree due to di¤erent beliefs, the manager's information makes him more congruent with board members, motivating them to report their information truthfully. In contrast, under con ‡icting preferences, higher managerial expertise makes it less costly for board members to misreport their information because they expect a more informed manager to react less to their advice. Interestingly, this implies that if con ‡icts of interest are substantial, a more informed manager does not always make more informed decisions. Although a more informed manager makes better decisions due to his own better information, he also …nds it more di¢ cult to get informed advice from the board. We show that this negative e¤ect can dominate, so that it can be Pareto improving to appoint a less informed manager, even if he has the same preferences as the more informed manager and any possible advisory board can be appointed.
Our results have implications for the empirical literature on the board's advisory role. 4 For example, they suggest that CEO expertise is important in explaining the board's advising e¤ectiveness, but whether its e¤ect is positive or negative systematically di¤ers across decisions and companies. They also suggest that when con ‡icts of interest are relatively more important than di¤erences in beliefs, then small advisory boards should be observed if there is a strong misalignment in preferences between the manager and potential board members, if the manager is su¢ ciently informed, or if information is su¢ ciently asymmetrically distributed among potential directors (cf. Section 6). heterogeneous agents and emphasize the externalities in information transmission. 5;6 Hence, the focus of our paper is on the e¤ects of size and composition of the advisory body and in particular, the optimality of advisory voting vis-à-vis advisory board -a question that has not been studied in the literature before. In contrast, the above papers mostly study the optimal allocation of authority and the role of the board's independence and alignment with the manager. The exception is Harris and Raviv (2008) , who also derive implications for board size, but focus on how large board size impedes information acquisition due to freeriding. 7 Our other contribution to this literature is to analyze two sources of communication frictions -con ‡icts of interest and di¤erent beliefs, and show that they have starkly di¤erent implications for the e¤ectiveness and optimal structure of the advisory body.
Our work is also related to the analysis of advisory voting in Levit and Malenko (2011) , but it is di¤erent in two key aspects. The …rst is our analysis of con ‡icting beliefs in addition to con ‡icting preferences, and the contrast between these two frictions. The second is a di¤erent economic mechanism due to the di¤erent way we view the role of advisory votes.
In their setting, the vote only matters in speci…c cases -when it changes the manager's decision from "not implement" the proposal to "implement", once the vote tally exceeds a certain threshold. In contrast, we view the vote tally as a¤ecting decisions even away from the threshold -e.g., because it a¤ects the extent to which the proposal is implemented. 8 Accordingly, the mechanism in Levit and Malenko (2011) works through shareholders conditioning their decisions on being pivotal; as a result, if the manager is su¢ ciently con ‡icted, the vote does not aggregate information regardless of the number of shareholders. In contrast, in our setting, information aggregation crucially depends on the number of shareholders. 5 Harris and Raviv (2008) consider multiple outside directors, but these directors are perfectly aligned and obtain perfectly correlated signals if they become informed, so they communicate as a single agent. 6 Levit (2017) studies communication from the board to the shareholders in a tender o¤er context. Song and Thakor (2006) consider a setting where the manager controls the quality of information available to the board under career concerns. These papers also treat the board as a single entity. 7 Warther (1998), Baranchuk and Dybvig (2009) , Malenko (2014) , Levit and Malenko (2016) , Chemmanur and Fedaseyeu (2017) , and Donaldson et al. (2018) study interactions between multiple directors within the board, but do not study the board's advisory role and do not feature the mechanisms that arise in our paper. See Adams et al. (2010) for a comprehensive survey of other papers in the board literature. 8 In practice, both roles are important: the literature shows both a monotonic increase in the probability and extent of proposal implementation as a function of the vote tally (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2013 ) and a discrete jump in the probability of implementation around certain cuto¤s (e.g., Cuñat et al., 2012) . Technically, this di¤erence is manifested through a binary manager's action in Levit and Malenko (2011) and a continuous manager's action in our paper.
More generally, our paper is related to the large literature on cheap talk, which studies transmission of non-veri…able information under con ‡icting preferences (Crawford and Sobel, 1982 Galeotti et al., 2013) . Our analysis of the case of con ‡icting preferences is related to Morgan and Stocken (2008) and their result that full information revelation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample, but not with a large one. We contribute to this literature in several ways. Most importantly, we show that the results under heterogeneous preferences (which the literature focuses on) are the opposite of those under heterogeneous beliefs. We also show how both communication frictions can be simultaneously captured in a simple tractable model with closed-form solutions. Finally, di¤erently from the above papers, our setting incorporates agents with heterogeneous relevance of private information, allowing us to study the optimal composition of the advisory body, which those papers do not study.
Our paper also relates to the literature on heterogeneous priors. Morris (1995) provides an overview of the heterogeneous prior assumption, discusses why it is consistent with rationality, and concludes that "there are some cases in which di¤erences in prior beliefs are essential to understanding economic phenomena." Our model also features rational agents: although they have potentially di¤erent priors, they are not dogmatic and rationally update their beliefs in a Bayesian way after receiving new information. Overall, there is growing empirical evidence suggesting that heterogeneous priors are important to explain corporate …nance decisions and the dynamics of asset prices and volume. 9 Accordingly, there is a large theoretical literature studying the implications of heterogeneous priors. 10 The closest papers 
Model
In this section, we present a simple model, which captures heterogeneous preferences, heterogeneous beliefs, and dispersed private information, and has tractable and intuitive solutions.
The …rm needs to make a decision, denoted by a. The value of this decision depends on the unknown state of the world Z. The decision a¤ects the payo¤s of the …rm's shareholders, managers, employees, customers, industry participants, and other stakeholders of the …rm.
Speci…cally, there is a set of N agents indexed by i, i 2 f1; :::; N g, characterized by their preferences b i such that the payo¤ of agent i from action a given state Z is
The information structure is as follows. The state of the world is equal to the weighted sum of N signals:
where c i > 0 and i are independent and identically distributed. The setup so far captures heterogeneous preferences and information dispersed among the agents. In addition, to capture the possibility that agents may have heterogeneous beliefs, we assume that agents have di¤erent priors about the distribution of signals i . Intuitively, some agents can be ex-ante more bullish about the prospects of the acquisition and the value of the target, while others can be more bearish. To capture this feature in a tractable way and derive closed form solutions, we make the following distributional assumption. We assume that i is a binary signal equal to 1 with probability ' and 0 with probability 1 ', and agents may potentially disagree about ': agent i's prior of ' is characterized by the Beta distribution with parameters ( i ; i ). 11 The case of i = captures the case of common priors: for example, if i = 1 and = 2, all agents believe that ' is uniformly distributed
Parameter ' captures the intrinsic value of the decision: when ' is higher, the state is likely to be higher, so the optimal action is higher as well. Parameter i captures how optimistic agent i is about the state: those with a higher i are ex-ante more optimistic than those with a lower i . 12 While agents may have di¤erent prior beliefs, they update their beliefs rationally (according to Bayes'rule) when they receive new information.
To summarize, each agent is characterized by his preference parameter b i (which re ‡ects his ideal action if the state were known), belief i (which captures whether he is ex-ante bullish or bearish about the state), and private signal about the state i with relative importance c i . Parameters b i , i , and c i are publicly known.
We assume that parameters b i and i satisfy (b i b m )( i m ) 0 for any i. This assumption is made so that agent i can be interpreted as biased towards a higher or lower action relative to the manager, where this bias can come from a combination of two sources - 11 That is, given the agent's belief i , the density of ' is f i (') =
and ( ) is the gamma function. 12 Indeed, the expected value of a Beta distribution with parameters ( i ; i ) is i , which increases in i . Hence, given quadratic preferences, the optimal action of an agent with a higher i is higher, as formally shown by (4) below.
di¤erent preferences over actions and di¤erent prior beliefs about the state. 13 This assumption is automatically satis…ed if only one communication friction is present, i.e., if the agents either have common preferences or same priors.
The timeline is as follows. There is an advisory body (committee) B, which is a subset of all agents, B f1; :::; N g, and a "decision-maker" from the set of agents, indexed by m 2 f1; :::; N g, m = 2 B. We will refer to this decision-maker as the manager, but it can be any agent with decision-making authority in the organization. After the agents learn their private signals, all members of the advisory body simultaneously communicate their information to the manager (via cheap talk), and the manager then takes the action that maximizes his payo¤.
We look for equilibria in pure strategies. Because signals are binary, it is without loss of generality to consider a binary message space: the strategy of agent i is a mapping from his signal i 2 f0; 1g into a binary non-veri…able message m i 2 f0; 1g. Given the quadratic payo¤ function, the optimal action of the manager is the sum of b m and his expectation of the state given the signals he learned ( i ; i 2 R) and his prior m :
The subscript m in the expectation operator E m highlights that the manager uses his own prior m to update his beliefs about the unknown signals j ; j 2 R, from his knowledge of signals i ; i 2 R. In the appendix, using the properties of the Beta distribution, we derive a simple expression for the manager's posterior beliefs and obtain the following result:
Lemma 1 (Optimal action of the manager) Suppose that after the communication stage, the manager knows the subset R of signals. Then his optimal action is
where jRj is the number of signals in R.
The higher are the revealed signals i ; i 2 R, the higher is the manager's posterior belief about the state, and hence the higher is his optimal action (e.g., o¤er price for a target)
given this information. Expression (4) also shows the e¤ect of heterogeneous preferences and heterogeneous beliefs on the manager's action. A higher b m induces the manager to take a higher action given the same information. Likewise, a higher m , capturing more optimistic ex-ante beliefs, also induces the manager to take a higher action. Note, however, that unlike heterogeneity in preferences, whose e¤ect does not depend on the manager's information, heterogeneity in beliefs becomes less important as the manager becomes more informed and updates his beliefs. In particular, as the set R expands, the term 1 +jRj P j2 R c j , and hence the e¤ect of m on the manager's action, decreases. In the extreme case, if b m = b j and R = f1; :::; N g, the manager's optimal action coincides with the optimal action from the perspective of any other agent.
Using Lemma 1, we next examine when a given committee member will truthfully reveal his information to the manager. Consider any agent i and suppose that the manager knows 
In contrast, if agent i misreports and says that his signal is 1 i , the manager's action is
Because agent i does not know the realization of other agents' signals when he communicates with the manager, he compares his expected payo¤ from actions a m ( R ; i ) and a m ( R ; 1 i ) given his signal i and his own prior beliefs about the distribution of those signals, and reports his signal truthfully if and only if:
where i is the set of all signals but i and P i ( i j i ) is agent i's belief given his signal i and his own prior.
The next proposition characterizes the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for (7) to be satis…ed. 
Intuitively, the left-hand side of (8) illustrates the agent's bene…t from misreporting the signal, while the right-hand side illustrates his cost of misreporting. The logic is as follows.
First, as (8) this information in the way that is optimal for him. Whenever any of these frictions is present, the agent may have incentive to misreport. In particular, di¤erences in preferences create incentives for misreporting as is standard in cheap talk games: the agent wants to tilt the manager's action in the direction of his preference, b i . Similarly, if the agent and manager have di¤erent priors -for example, if the manager is ex-ante more optimistic about the state than the agent, the agent will want to correct this "bias in beliefs" by reporting a more negative signal. Overall, these results imply that, other things equal, an advisory committee will be less e¤ective in its advisory role if the manager is su¢ ciently di¤erent from the committee members in either preferences of prior beliefs about the optimal decision. Second, regardless of the source of communication frictions, agent i is more likely to report his signal truthfully if his information is more important: the IC constraint (8) is relaxed when c i increases. Intuitively, the agent faces a trade-o¤: while he wants to tilt the manager in the direction of his optimal action (the bene…t of misreporting), he is also afraid to tilt it too much, away even from the optimal action from the agent's perspective (the cost of misreporting). As the agent's information becomes more important and hence the manager is expected to react more strongly to the agent's message, this fear makes the agent more reluctant to misreport.
Despite the above similarities between the two sources of communication frictions, we next show that they have very di¤erent implications for the optimal advisory structures.
Our …rst observation, which is the key implication of (8) , is that the agent's incentive to report his information truthfully depends on whether other members of the advisory body reveal their information to the manager (i.e., on R), but whether this dependence is positive or negative crucially depends on whether communication is hampered by heterogeneity in preferences or heterogeneity in beliefs. In particular, how much information the manager obtains from other committee members is captured by the term
on both sides of (8): this term decreases as the set R expands, i.e., as more committee members reveal their information to the manager. As (8) To explain the intuition and the implications more clearly, we rewrite (8) for each of these two cases separately and discuss the intuition behind each. 
Hence, the more information the manager gets from other members of the advisory body (i.e., the higher is jRj and the lower is P j2 Rnfig c j ), the more likely it is that agent i will also truthfully communicate his information to him. We refer to this e¤ect as the positive externality e¤ect of information transmission, because more information revealed to the manager by some agents has a positive e¤ect on further information aggregation by encouraging other agents to report their information truthfully. The reason is that as the manager learns more information from others, he becomes more congruent with the agent, i.e., the manager's optimal action becomes closer to agent i's preferred action. This happens for two related and 14 Here if Rn fig is an empty set, the right-hand side of (9) is equal to in…nity, i.e., (9) is always satis…ed. complementary reasons. First, heterogeneous prior beliefs generate disagreement only over the information that is still unknown -once a certain piece of information gets revealed, there is nothing to disagree about. Hence, the more information gets known to the manager, the more agreement there is between the manager and the agent about the optimal decision.
The second e¤ect, which is related and acts in the same direction, is that once a signal about the state is revealed, agents update their posteriors about the distribution of the state based on the realization of the signal. Hence, even if their prior beliefs were initially very di¤erent, they become closer to each other following the revelation of new information.
Together, these two e¤ects imply that the manager's and agent's optimal actions be- To illustrate this intuition in the context of our M&A example, suppose that the acquisition target is a pharmaceutical company with a pipeline of drugs it is developing. The optimal o¤er price then crucially depends on the success probability of each drug, but given that such drugs have not been developed before, di¤erent members of the advisory body may have very di¤erent priors about the likelihood of success of each drug. If they think the manager is too optimistic about the likelihood of success, they may try to counteract this optimism by more negative (non-truthful) reports about the aspects of the merger they are knowledgeable about. If, however, the advisory body includes an expert who knows the state of research on a particular disease, he can inform the manager about whether a given drug will be a failure or a success. Once this information is revealed to the manager, the uncertainty in target value coming from the success of this drug disappears, increasing the manager's congruence with other advisors (the …rst e¤ect described above). Moreover, other advisors also realize that following the expert's report, the manager will adjust his prior belief about the likelihood of success of other drugs towards its correct value. This makes the manager even more congruent with other advisors and further decreases their incentives to misreport (the second e¤ect described above).
Heterogeneity in preferences:
In contrast to the case of belief heterogeneity, the more information the manager gets from other members of the advisory body (i.e., the higher is jRj and the lower is P j2 Rnfig c j ), the less likely it is that agent i will truthfully communicate his information to him. We refer to this e¤ect as the negative externality e¤ect of information transmission, because more information obtained by the manager from some agents discourages further information aggregation by harming the credibility of other agents. Intuitively, as the manager learns more information from others, the e¤ect of the agent's message on his actions decreases.
Hence, the agent is less worried that misreporting the signal may tilt the manager's action too far away from his own optimal action and has stronger incentives to misreport (this intuition is similar to the intuition above of why a higher c i relaxes the agent's IC constraint). 15 These externalities in information transmission imply that the size of the advisory body a¤ects whether it is e¤ective in its advisory role, but that the e¤ect of size depends on whether communication is hampered by di¤erences in preferences or di¤erences in beliefs.
To formalize this intuition, we de…ne advisory body B to be e¢ cient at providing advice to the manager if truthful communication by all members of B to the manager is an equilibrium.
The next result shows how the size jBj of the advisory body a¤ects whether it is e¢ cient in its advisory role. 
Optimal advisory committee
We now use the results in the previous section to analyze the optimal composition of the advisory committee. We start this analysis by showing that each agent is ex-ante better o¤ if the manager is ex-post more informed. Formally:
Lemma 2 (Ex-ante payo¤s) Suppose that in equilibrium, the manager learns subset R of the signals and does not learn all the other signals, R f1; :::; N gnR. Then the ex-ante equilibrium payo¤ of agent i is given by
where
In particular, the ex-ante equilibrium payo¤ of agent i is increasing in jRj and decreasing in any c k ; k 2 R.
Intuitively, agent i's utility from the manager's action is determined by how much information the manager's action re ‡ects and by how di¤erent the manager's action is from the agent's optimal action given this information (due to their di¤erent preferences and beliefs). Term B i ( ) re ‡ects the former -the loss in the agent's expected utility due to residual variance in the state, i.e., the fact that the manager's action does not re ‡ect signals in R.
All the other terms capture the latter: Term (b m b i ) 2 is the loss in agent i's utility due to the fact that the manager's action re ‡ects his rather than agent i 's preference, while terms A im ( ) and C im ( ) re ‡ect the additional e¤ects due to the ex-post belief divergence between agent i and the manager.
Lemma 2 shows that for any agent in the economy, his ex-ante utility (before learning his private signal) is higher when more information is known to the manager ex-post, i.e., when the set R is larger and c j ; j 2 R, is lower. For example, when all agents'information has the same importance, i.e., c i = c for all i, then for any i and b i , each agent simply wants to maximize jRj, the number of signals that the manager learns from the advisory body.
Lemma 2 is important because it allows us to derive Proposition 3 about the optimal composition of the committee for any possible objective function that weakly increases in the utility of each agent in the economy and strictly increases in the utility of at least one of them, without specifying this objective function. An example of such an objective function is the weighted average of all agents'expected payo¤s with any possible non-negative (and at least one strictly positive) weights. The only assumption we make for Proposition 3 is that there is an in…nitesimally small positive cost of including each agent in the advisory body.
This assumption ensures that it is optimal to search for the optimal advisory committee among the set of committees in which all members truthfully communicate their information to the manager.
The next proposition shows that the optimal advisory committee includes all informed agents (other than the manager) when communication is hampered by con ‡icting beliefs, but is a strict subset of all informed agents when communication is hampered by con ‡icting preferences.
Proposition 3 (Optimal advisory committee) Consider any objective function that
weakly increases in the expected utility of each agent and strictly increases in the expected utility of at least one agent.
If agents have heterogeneous beliefs (
, the optimal advisory body is the entire set of agents: B = f1; :::; N gnfmg. c i , the optimal advisory body is a strict subset of all agents: B f1; :::; N gnfmg.
Intuitively, if communication is hampered by heterogeneous beliefs, the positive externality e¤ect implies that the more agents are included in the advisory body and reveal their information to the manager, the more likely it is that other agents will truthfully report their information to the manager as well. In fact, if the advisory body is the set of all informed agents, there is an equilibrium in which each agent reports his information truthfully. Because this maximizes the amount of information available to the manager and thus, given Lemma 2, maximizes the ex-ante payo¤ of all agents, this advisory body is optimal.
In contrast, if communication is hampered by heterogeneous preferences, the negative externality e¤ect and Proposition 2 in particular, imply that if the advisory body is too large (e.g., if it consists of all informed agents) and the misalignment in preferences is signi…cant, 16 16 This is captured by the assumption jb m b i j > there is no equilibrium in which all members report their information truthfully. Thus, any committee in which all its members communicate truthfully must be a strict subset of all informed agents. As long as there is an in…nitesimal cost of including agents who do not contribute any information, the optimal advisory body will be a strict subset of all agents.
Our setup assumes that if all agents in the economy combine their information together, the state is known with certainty. In practice, there could be some residual information that none of the agents knows. The model can be easily extended to capture this feature, and Proposition 3 will continue to hold as long as the amount of this residual unknown information is not too large. If it is very large and an agent's prior beliefs are very di¤erent from the manager's, then even if all other agents reveal their signals to the manager, it may not be su¢ cient to align their very di¤erent priors, giving the agent incentives to misreport.
Importantly, the positive and negative externalities channels continue to hold regardless of the amount of residual unknown information.
Advisory voting vs. advisory board
Proposition 3 has implications for the use of advisory shareholder voting vs. advisory boards.
Under advisory voting, each shareholder of the …rm is asked to convey his views to the management via the vote. If, in addition, the management gets the opinion of other informed stakeholders, such as employees, business partners, and external consultants, the resulting decision-making protocol resembles our model with B = f1; :::; N gnfmg. One interpretation of Proposition 3 is that such an advisory vote is optimal if agents have aligned preferences, but disagree due to di¤erences in beliefs. Importantly, our paper does not imply that the advisory vote alone is optimal: for many decisions, the set of informed agents includes not only shareholders, but other informed parties as well. Instead, our paper implies that under heterogeneous beliefs, holding an advisory vote is a necessary part of the optimal advisory process, and that the opinion of shareholders needs to be combined with the opinion of other informed parties.
In contrast, when decisions are made with the help of an advisory board, the management does not ask all shareholders for their opinions and gets feedback only from the board members, i.e., from a relatively small subset of people having information. Proposition 3 suggests that this is optimal if agents have heterogeneous preferences but common beliefs.
It is worth pointing out that in this comparison of advisory voting and board, we isolate one channel -how di¤erent size and composition of the advisory body a¤ect aggregation of dispersed private information. There are other channels through which the composition of the advisory body could matter, with one notable channel being incentivizing information acquisition. It would be interesting to examine whether heterogeneity in preferences vs.
beliefs play a di¤erent role in this context as well, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
While both con ‡icts of interest and di¤erences in beliefs are likely to play a role in practice, there are certain decisions for which di¤erences in beliefs are arguably more important than con ‡icts of interest, and vice versa. For example, investments in brand new technologies or CSR activities are likely to be the subject of substantial disagreement. In contrast, if the …rm is contemplating to increase the scale of production, then con ‡icts of interest (e.g., due
to managerial empire-building) are likely to play a larger role than di¤erences in beliefs. If this is so, our model implies that management should get input on decisions such as CSR activities from as many informed parties as possible, so using an advisory vote is optimal.
Conversely, investment decisions that are subject to signi…cant con ‡icts of interest should be made using the input from a limited set of agents, such as the board of directors or a committee within the board.
Another relevant example are corporate governance changes, which are likely to combine both strong con ‡icts of interest and substantial di¤erences in beliefs. Indeed, on the one hand, the decision to allocate more power to shareholders deprives the manager of his private bene…ts of control, generating a substantial con ‡ict of interest. On the other hand, even
shareholders often disagree about which governance arrangement is optimal for any given …rm. A recent example is the debate about proxy access, when di¤erent shareholders and governance experts disagreed about the optimal terms of proxy access, such as the minimum size and holding period requirements. 17 Our model suggests that both decision-making protocols -holding an advisory shareholder vote or consulting a relatively small advisory committee (e.g., composed of the …rm's large shareholders) -can be optimal for corporate governance decisions, depending on which friction is more important. 17 See, e.g., "The Proxy Access Debate", The New York Times, October 9, 2009.
Optimal board composition
The analysis so far has shown that when agents have heterogeneous priors but common preferences, the optimal advisory body is uniquely determined -it is the set of all informed agents. In contrast, when agents have common priors but heterogeneous preferences, the optimal advisory body is a strict subset of all informed agents, which we will from now on refer to as the board. But which agents should be put on this advisory board? We explore this question in this section.
When agents have common priors, the expected utility of each agent i becomes particularly simple: in equations (11)- (12), A im (R) and C im (R) both equal zero, and the residual variance B i (R) is the same for every agent. Therefore, board composition that maximizes an agent's ex-ante expected payo¤ is the same across all agents -it minimizes the residual variance subject to the constraint that each board member truthfully communicates his information to the manager. In other words, the optimal board B solves the following problem:
where B m is the set all agents other than the board and the manager. 18 Since agents have common priors, they di¤er in two parameters -the importance of their signals and their preferences. It is natural to conjecture that, all else equal, the optimal advisory board should include agents with more important information (i.e., higher c i ) and agents whose preferences are more aligned with the manager (i.e., lower jb m b i j). The latter makes advice more credible. The former makes it more relevant. It turns out that while the latter part of the conjecture is true, the former is false.
Speci…cally, let us …rst consider two agents, i and j, who have the same relevance of information (c i = c j ) but di¤erent preferences, and suppose agent i is more aligned with the manager: jb m b i j < jb m b j j. Consider any board that includes agent j but not i (denote this board B j ) and consider a di¤erent board, which includes the same members as B j , except that agent i is replaced by j (denote this other board B i ). It is easy to see from (13)- (14) that board B j is weakly dominated by board B i in the following sense: If board B j is optimal, then board B i is optimal as well; however, if board B j is optimal, then board B j may be suboptimal. In particular, this could happen if the IC constraint (14) for agent i is satis…ed, but it is violated for agent j when we replace agent i by agent j. In this sense, all else equal, the optimal advisory board should include agents whose preferences are more aligned with the manager.
In contrast, now consider two agents, i and j, with the same preferences (b i = b j ) but di¤erent relevance of information, and suppose agent i has information of greater importance:
It is now possible that board B j (that includes agent j but not i) is optimal, while board B i (i.e., the same board except that agent j is replaced by agent i) is not optimal. The reason are negative externalities in communication: replacing agent j by agent i decreases the incentives of other informed board members to communicate their information truthfully, which can be detrimental. Intuitively, a very informed but biased board member needs assurance that his opinion will have a su¢ ciently high in ‡uence to have incentives to communicate his information. If another powerful director joins the board, this in ‡uence will be lower, breaking down e¢ cient communication. To see that this negative e¤ect can be signi…cant enough to make board B i suboptimal, consider the following example.
Example 1 (Adding less informed board members can be optimal)
There is a manager indexed by N , and N 1 other informed agents, i = 1; :::; N 1.
For simplicity, we normalize
Suppose that the set of informed (non-manager) agents includes three agents (i = 1; 2; 3) with relatively small preference biases jb i b m j relative to their information, while the remaining agents have very high preference biases relative to their information: jb i b m j > c i 2 for i > 3, so that they never truthfully reveal their information. Then, the optimal board will never include any agent i > 3. Suppose also that among the …rst three agents, c 1 > c 2 > c 3 , but agent 1 has very relevant information compared to agents 2 and 3 (c 1 >> c 2 ), so that the optimal advisory board should include
As noted above, the optimal board should include agent 1 and should not include any of the agents i > 3. It turns out that the optimal board is B = f1; 3g and not f1; 2g, even though agent 2 has more relevant information than agent 3 and the same preferences. This is because if the board consisted of agents 1 and 2, the IC constraint of agent 1 would be violated because by assumption,
, so agent 1's information would not be communicated.
Expertise of the manager
In practice, the company's board of directors provides advice to the management on many di¤erent issues, even on those where a di¤erent advisory structure would potentially be optimal. Therefore, in this section, rather than asking the question of the optimal composition of the advisory body, we examine the e¤ectiveness of the advisory role of any given board.
In particular, an important question is how the advisory function of the board is a¤ected by the manager's expertise: are they complements or substitutes? Both views have been expressed in the academic literature, but they have not been formally explored in a uni…ed framework. 19 Our analysis shows that whether the two are complements or substitutes strongly depends on the nature of communication frictions.
To study this question, we need to introduce a measure of the manager's expertise.
For this purpose, we consider a small extension of the basic model by assuming that the manager knows a subset S of signals f i ; i 6 = mg in addition to signal m . If S = ;, then the manager only knows his private signal m , as in the basic model. If S 6 = ;, then the manager also knows some signals of the other agents, in addition to his private signal m .
We interpret an expansion/contraction of S (i.e., addition/removal of signals to/from S) as an increase/decrease in the manager's expertise. 20 Speci…cally, …x all parameters of the model and consider any board B, i.e., a subset of agents f1; :::; N g. As before, we say that board B is e¢ cient at providing advice to the 19 For example, Armstrong et al. (2010) discuss that managers'informational advantage may impede the advisory role of outside directors. On the other hand, Sundaramurthy et al. (2014) hypothesize that board members'experience and expertise will be more impactful when the manager has greater expertise as well. 20 An alternative way to model higher managerial expertise is to increase c m , while normalizing P N i=1 c i = 1. This model leads to the same result. However, it cannot be used to analyze how …rm value changes with the manager's expertise because a change in c m changes the distribution of state Z in this formulation. manager if truthful communication by all members of B to the manager is an equilibrium.
Without loss of generality, consider boards in which each member has some information that the manager does not already know: f i ; i 2 Bg \ S = ;. 21 The next proposition shows how the advising e¤ectiveness of the board varies with the manager's information:
Proposition 4 (Manager' s expertise). Consider any board B with f i ; i 2 Bg \ S = ;.
c i 8i 2 B and board B is e¢ cient at providing advice under S, then it is also e¢ cient at providing advice if set S expands, i.e., as the manager becomes more informed.
8i 2 B and board B is e¢ cient at providing advice under S, then it is also e¢ cient at prodiving advice if set S contracts, i.e., as the manager becomes less informed.
Intuitively, as the manager becomes more informed, there is less information relevant for the decision that neither the manager nor the board knows. This has di¤erent e¤ects depending on the nature of communication frictions. When heterogeneous beliefs are relatively more important, the key consequence is the increase in the manager's congruence because there is less information that the manager and board members can disagree about. As a result, board members have stronger incentives to truthfully reveal their information to the manager, explaining the …rst statement of the proposition. In contrast, when communication is primarily hampered by con ‡icts of interest, greater managerial expertise decreases directors'costs of misreporting their information because the manager is expected to react less to each director's message. This explains the second statement of the proposition.
It is interesting to compare this analysis of the manager's expertise to the analysis of the optimal advisory committee in Section 4. On the one hand, the intuition behind Proposition 4 is close to the intuition behind the positive and negative externalities in Section 3: it relies on how an increase in the manager's information set a¤ects any given committee member's incentives to truthfully reveal his information. On the other hand, the two are also quite di¤erent. In Proposition 4, the manager is more vs. less informed for an exogenous reason, based on his expertise, ability, and experience. In Section 3, whether the manager is more or less informed arises endogenously -it depends on which members of the advisory committee communicate their information truthfully, which is a function of the committee composition.
This di¤erence implies that the problem with multiple senders (advisors) does not reduce to the problem with a single sender, and the two problems have di¤erent implications. To see this, consider a single sender-receiver (i.e., single advisor-manager) problem. Interestingly, the result of Proposition 4 that the manager's expertise may impede the board's advising e¤ectiveness implies that higher managerial expertise is not always bene…cial. It can be Pareto improving to appoint a less informed manager, even if the less informed manager has the same preferences as the more informed manager, and even if the composition of the advisory board can be chosen optimally. Intuitively, when heterogeneity in beliefs is small while heterogeneity in preferences is substantial, the manager's expertise has two opposing e¤ects on the quality of decision-making. On the one hand, a less informed manager makes worse decisions due to his own information about the state being worse. On the other hand, a less informed manager improves the advisory role of the board and hence obtains more information from board members, increasing the quality of decision-making.
The numerical example below illustrates that this second e¤ect can dominate.
Example 2 (Manager' s expertise can be harmful)
There is a manager and 100 other agents, divided into two groups. The parameters are: In contrast, the fact that a more informed manager improves the advisory role of the board when con ‡icts of interest play a small role relative to di¤erences in beliefs, implies that in this case, both e¤ects act in the same direction. As the manager becomes more informed, he both makes better decisions due to his own information and can also get better advice from other agents.
Implications
The literature on the board's advisory role studies how the presence of directors with a certain type of expertise is related to corporate policies and performance (e.g., Dass et al., 2014; Field and Mkrtchyan, 2016; Harford and Schonlau, 2013 ; and others). The analysis in Section 5 suggests that this relationship will be a¤ected by CEO expertise, 22 but whether the link between directors'expertise and corporate outcomes (which could proxy for the board's advising e¤ectiveness) is strengthened or weakened by CEO expertise depends on the source of communication frictions. In cases where board members and the CEO have con ‡icting preferences, CEO expertise will weaken the advisory role of the board. In contrast, in cases where they have aligned preferences but disagree due to di¤erent beliefs, CEO expertise will enhance the board's advising e¤ectiveness.
Whether con ‡icting preferences or di¤erences in beliefs are more important is likely to di¤er both across decisions and across companies. For example, there is likely to be strong heterogeneity in prior beliefs about the success of a brand new technology or the development of an innovative drug. Likewise, there is often substantial disagreement about the e¤ect of corporate governance policies, even among parties with very similar interests, such as shareholders with similar portfolios. 23 The literature has proposed several measures of belief heterogeneity that could be used to assess how di¤erent agents'beliefs are in a given situation Our model also provides implications about the determinants of the optimal advisory committee size. Consider the case where agents have common priors but heterogeneous preferences, so that the optimal advisory committee consists of a strict subset of all informed agents (Proposition 3), which we refer to as the board. When should we observe smaller versus larger advisory boards? Recall that the optimal advisory board in this case solves problem (13)- (14) . As (13)- (14) show, it is generally di¢ cult to make statements about the optimal board size, because the solution to this problem depends a lot on the speci…cs of heterogeneity among agents. It is, however, possible to make several observations about 22 The only paper we are aware of that tests the relationship between CEO expertise and directors'advisory role is Sundaramurthy et al. (2014) in the context of IPOs by biotech …rms. 23 See, e.g., "A Lack of Consensus on Corporate Governance"(The New York Times, September 29, 2015) and the proxy access debate discussed in Section 4.1.
when a small board consisting of only a few members is more likely to be observed. First, the model implies that a small board is optimal if there is strong misalignment in preferences between the manager and potential board members. As (14) shows, in this case, board members will have incentives to misreport their information unless the board is su¢ ciently small. 24 Second, a small board is optimal if the manager is su¢ ciently informed.
Indeed, as Proposition 4 shows, when agents have common beliefs but heterogeneous preferences, the manager's expertise impedes the advisory role of any board. Hence, if the board is large, board members will not truthfully reveal their information to a highly informed manager. Third, a small board is optimal if information is highly asymmetrically distributed Since board composition is chosen endogenously, our analysis does not generally predict 24 To see this in the simplest way, suppose all potential board members have equally relevant information. Then, the optimal advisory board is the committee of the highest possible size that allows truthful communication by all its members. As (13)- (14) imply, the solution is to rank all agents by the degree of their preference misalignment with the manager jb i b m j, and then gradually expand B by including agents with progressively larger preference misalignments, up to the point when the next included agent's IC constraint for truth-telling is violated. In this setting, if we now increase the degree of misalignment by scaling up jb i b m j by some constant C for all i, then the optimal board size will monotonically decrease in C and will become zero as C becomes large enough.
any speci…c correlation between board size and performance. It does, however, predict how performance will be a¤ected by exogenous changes in board size. One example is the 1976 law in Germany, which introduced new requirements for supervisory board size. Jenter et al.
(2018) study this regulation via regression-discontinuity and di¤erence-in-di¤erences analyses and conclude that forcing …rms to have larger boards lowers performance and value. This evidence is consistent with our model if heterogeneity in preferences is strong (di¤erences in preferences are particularly likely in German supervisory boards, which contain shareholder and employee representatives, but no executive directors). Indeed, our model predicts that adding members to the optimal board determined by (13)- (14) decreases value because it does not lead to more communication and better advice but imposes additional costs, for example, the costs of new board members'compensation. 25 Finally, the paper has implications for advisory (non-binding) shareholder voting. The literature has looked at the degree of management's responsiveness to the advisory vote tally, which can be interpreted as the e¤ectiveness of the vote's advisory role (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2010; Ferri, 2012) . Our analysis predicts that, holding the di¤erences in beliefs between shareholders and management …xed, a greater misalignment in preferences between them decreases the advisory e¤ectiveness of the vote.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to study the optimal design of the advisory committee when information about the decision is dispersed among multiple stakeholders of the company. We analyze a setting where members of the advisory committee communicate their information to a partially informed decision-maker (the manager), who then takes the optimal action from his perspective. In this setting, communication from any advisory committee member to the manager can be inhibited by two key frictions, con ‡icting preferences and disagreements due to di¤erent prior beliefs: Both frictions may induce the advisor to misreport his information, in order to tilt the manager's action in the advisor's preferred direction. We study both of these frictions and show that they have drastically di¤erent implications for the advising e¤ectiveness of any committee and for the composition of the optimal committee. 25 These costs are assumed to be in…nitesimally positive in our setting, but could be signi…cant in practice.
Speci…cally, when agents have aligned preferences but disagree due to di¤erences in beliefs, communication from committee members to the manager exhibits positive externalities:
As more agents truthfully reveal their information to the manager, the incentives of other agents to reveal their information increase, inducing further information aggregation. In contrast, when communication is primarily impeded by heterogeneous preferences, there are negative externalities: As more agents truthfully reveal their information to the manager, other agents have stronger incentives to misreport. We show that due to these externalities, the optimal advisory body is the set of all informed agents under heterogeneous beliefs, but a strict subset of all informed agents under heterogeneous preferences. This implies that advisory shareholder voting, combined with the manager seeking the advice of other informed stakeholders, is e¤ective for issues involving considerable heterogeneity in beliefs, such as the …rm's CSR practices. Conversely, it is better to seek advice from a small advisory board on issues involving a signi…cant misalignment in preferences, such as the decision to scale up the production.
We also study the advising e¤ectiveness of any given board and show that the manager's expertise enhances the board's advisory role when heterogeneous beliefs are the key communication friction, but impedes it when heterogeneous preferences are most important.
Finally, we highlight that it is not always optimal to seek advice from the most informed agents or to appoint the most informed decision-makers: When heterogeneity in preferences is substantial, picking the less informed board member out of two potential candidates with the same preferences can be Pareto improving. Likewise, it can be Pareto improving to pick the less informed manager out of two candidates with the same preferences.
Appendix: Proofs Proof of Lemma 1
Since i is a binary signal equal to 1 with probability ' and 0 with probability 1 ', the manager's optimal action (4) can be written as:
Let 1 R P i2R i be the number of signals in R equal to 1. The conditional probability that 1 R signals out of jRj are equal to one given ' is P (1 R j') =
Since the prior distribution is Beta and the likelihood function is Binomial, the posterior distribution is also Beta but with di¤erent parameters (this is a known property of the Beta distribution). Formally, let P i (1 R ) be agent i's assessed probability that 1 R signals out of jRj are equal to 1 (over all possible values of '). Using Bayes rule, agent i's posterior belief of ', P i ('j1 R ), is
which is some constant that does not depend on ' times ' i +1 R 1 (1 ') i +jRj 1 R 1 .
Since the posterior beliefs must integrate to one over possible values of ', this automatically implies that the posterior belief also follows a Beta distribution with parameters ( i + 1 R ; i + jRj 1 R ) and density
It is known that the mean of a Beta distribution with parameters ( ; ) is + . Therefore, using these expressions and the above posterior distribution, agent i's expected value of ' is
, which proves the lemma.
Auxiliary Lemma A.1
Suppose ' Beta( ; ) and X = fx 1 ; x 2 ; ; x n g , where x i 2 f0; 1g are independent draws with x i = 1 with probability '.
Proof. It is known that the …rst two moments of a random variable X distributed according to a Beta distribution with parameters and are E [X] = + and E [X 2 ] = and
. Plugging this expression into (17) and simplifying using Auxiliary Lemma A.1, Combining with (15) and (16) gives (11)- (12) . This immediately shows that the ex-ante payo¤ of any agent i is increasing in jRj and is decreasing in c k for any k 2 R. In other words, when the manager learns an additional signal, A im ( ); B i ( ) and C im ( ) are reduced. Indeed, the greater information and the smaller unknown part of the state Z imply that the residual variance B i ( ) decreases. The …rst and third terms, i.e., A im ( ) and C im ( ), decrease as well, because agent i expects the additional signal to "persuade"the manager, such that they have a smaller expected divergence in their ex-post beliefs. This intuition holds in the opposite direction when c k ; k 2 R increases.
Proof of Proposition 1
Plugging (5) and (6) which is strictly smaller than N 1 if heterogeneity in preferences is su¢ ciently strong.
Proof of Proposition 3
We start with the …rst statement of the proposition, when b i = b j , i 6 = j . Suppose that the advisory body is B = f1; :::; N gnfmg. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which all agents in the advisory body truthfully reveal their information to the manager. Consider such an equilibrium and any agent i 2 B. Then R = f1; :::; N gnfig and Rn fig = ; , so using (8), the IC constraint of agent i is equivalent to 0 c i , which is always satis…ed. Hence, indeed, there exists an equilibrium in which the manager makes the decision knowing the information of all the agents, i = f1; :::; N g. Moreover, given Lemma 2, any agent i achieves his maximum possible ex-ante utility when R = f1; :::; N g. Therefore, B = f1; :::; N gnfmg is indeed optimal in this case. We next prove the second statement, when b i 6 = b j , i = j . First, note that when i = for all i, then all agents have exactly the same preferences about the manager's ex-post information set R: they would like to minimize 
where B m B [ fmg. Thus, for any objective function that weakly increases in each agent's ex-ante utility and strictly increases in at least one agent's ex-ante utility, the optimal advisory body is the set of agents such that 1) all agents truthfully communicate their information to the manager 2) this set minimizes (18) . Consider the solution to this minimization problem. We next prove that it is a strict subset of f1; :::; N gnfmg under the conditions in the proposition. Indeed, if the advisory body is the set of all agents, B = f1; :::; N gnfmg, then B m = ;, so (8) c i . Since, by assumption, this inequality is violated for at least one of the agents, there is no equilibrium in which all agents truthfully reveal their information to the manager. Hence, B = f1; :::; N gnfmg is not an optimal advisory body, which implies that the optimal advisory body is a strict subset of all agents.
Proof of Proposition 4
Rewriting the IC constraint from Again consider an expansion of S by one element that does not belong to f i ; i 2 Bg. Suppose that j m i j 1 2 8i 2 B. Then, an expansion in S reduces J i for any i, because it increases jSj and decreases P j2 Bm c j . Hence, if J i 0 for all i for some S, then J i 0 8i for any contraction in set S.
